

“Development and Twentieth-century Colonialism in Africa: A Short History”

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There is a new sense of optimism today about the future of Sub-Saharan Africa. After being written off as hopeless by international donors for much of the 1980s and 1990s, Sub-Saharan Africa has seen a remarkable reversal of economic fortunes in recent years. Between 2004 and 2008 African economies grew an average of 6.5 per cent annually, and while growth slowed during the global financial crisis, rates have rebounded to more than 5 per cent a year since 2010.¹ What is more, Africa’s poverty rate has been falling steadily since the 1990s, with the percentage of people living in extreme poverty declining from 58 per cent in 1999 to 48 per cent by 2008.² There also have been important improvements in rates of educational completion and life expectancy. In the last decade in fact, eight of the top ten performers on the non-income dimensions of the United Nation’s Human Development Index were countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.³ These and other positive indicators, such as the increase in private sector investment and market-oriented, economic reforms, has led the World Bank to declare ‘that Africa could be on the brink of an economic take-off, much like China was 30 years ago, and India 20 years ago.’⁴

After the setbacks and hardships of the age of structural adjustment, one hopes this is finally Africa’s moment. But as the reference to Rostovian modernisation theory reminds us, this

is not the first time foreign interests and powers have waxed about the unprecedented opportunities for transformation in Africa. Nor would it be the first if such possibilities, which by the Bank's own admission face considerable challenges,⁵ should end in disappointment. It is worth recalling the heady optimism of the years immediately following the Second World War, when as Nicholas White has shown, the leading European colonial powers embarked on extensive development plans in Africa and Southeast Asia.⁶ Such plans were designed both to raise purchasing power and standards of living in the overseas territories and to alleviate US dollar shortages by stimulating colonial exports that would help pay for metropolitan reconstruction. As the British Colonial Secretary, Oliver Stanley, put it in 1944 'here we have an opportunity which may never recur, at a cost which is not extravagant, of setting the Colonial Empire on lines of development which will keep it in close and loyal contact with us.'⁷ Yet within a few short years much of the enthusiasm had waned, prompting business leaders like Frank Samuel, the Managing Director of the United Africa Company, to complain: 'there has been a great deal of wishful thinking on the part of many writers and speakers who have, since the war, created an impression that Tropical Africa is an El Dorado of wealth sorely neglected in the past and capable of being developed rapidly on a grand scale. I take a far more sober view of the position.'⁸ For Samuel, it was the barriers and challenges to progress, rather than the possibilities, that were most striking.⁹

In many ways, the post-war colonial development drives of Britain, France and the other European colonial empires, represent the culmination of a much deeper history of concepts, practices and debates about the prospects and setbacks of developing Africa. It is a history whose beginning stretches back to the *mission civilisatrice* and constructive imperialism doctrines of the late nineteenth century, and whose legacy, as the inter-governmental reports cited above remind

us, continues to be felt to this day. Gradually over the course of the twentieth century, the concept of development superseded earlier notions of Europe's civilising mission until by the late 1930s and 1940s, as Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard observe, it had become 'a framing device bringing together a range of interventionist policies and metropolitan finance with the explicit goal of raising colonial standards of living.'¹⁰ That development rose to such prominence during the closing stages of colonial rule is a testament to its semantic ambiguity, which enabled it to engage the desires and aspirations of diverse groups of African and European actors, and lent itself to being appropriated by a great variety of interests.¹¹

In this essay, I provide a brief overview of the history of development during the colonial period in Sub-Saharan Africa, beginning roughly in the 1890s and continuing through to the end of empire. It focuses predominantly on Britain and France, the two major colonial powers in Africa in the twentieth century, but some comparisons with the Belgian and Portuguese cases are also made. It examines how the concept of development became an increasingly important element of colonial policies and mentalities and how its meaning was transformed over the course of the twentieth century. Much of my focus will be on the final decades of colonial rule, especially from 1930 onward, when development became the central, organising concept underpinning the relationship between metropolitan Europe and colonial Africa.¹²

I

Given the amorphous quality of development, and its many and varied usages, it is imperative that we begin by making some clear distinctions. Development is a murky and often contentious term. Its ambiguity reflects, in large measure, the fact that it encompasses more aims than just achieving modernity and it refers not only to an intransitive, self-evolving process of change, but

also, increasingly, to intentional practices and actions initiated most often by state agencies. Much of the confusion surrounding ‘development’ is attributable to the fact that most books and articles written on the subject fail to explain coherently what is meant by the term, or they define the concept so broadly that it becomes devoid of substantive meaning. The first crucial distinction that needs to be made, following Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton, is between ‘development’ as an action or process, and ‘development’ as a goal or product.¹³ Development as a process refers to the actions that are taken or the measures implemented in order to become ‘developed’. This is development as a verb, whereas development as a product or goal refers to the results of development; what is achieved once one has experienced ‘development’ as a process.

Having goals is important. The problem arises when studies of development routinely conflate the means with the goal, by suggesting for example, that development ‘is empowering in the sense that the people concerned have a substantial degree of control [...] over the process through access to the means of accumulating social power.’¹⁴ In other words, one must be empowered in order to become more empowered, but if one is already empowered is one really in need of development? A more useful definition, for our purposes, might be to describe development simply as an intentional, organised intervention in collective affairs according to a general (if not universal) standard of improvement.¹⁵

We might also note that from the colonial period to the present day, development has been oscillating between two distinct poles: raising production and productivity on the one hand, and raising the living standards of people regarded as backward or underdeveloped on the other. The normative contents or ‘goals’ of development have shifted over time between these two poles, between the aim of making fuller or more efficient use of given economic resources –

usually by employing capitalist or market forces – and the objective of improving the living conditions or welfare of a given population. Toward which of these ends of development policies the pendulum is swinging depends in large measure on the power relations among and between the various actors involved. Closely related to this is another dimension of development; its potential to serve purposes of control.

And this leads us to Cowen's and Shenton's second distinction between 'development' as an immanent and objective process, and 'development' as a subjective course of action or intentional practice. The emergence and expansion of market capitalism is perhaps the most relevant example of a natural or spontaneous process of development. Enlightenment thinkers such as Adam Smith popularised the idea of unlimited and universal progress whereby human economic activity progressed through a succession of different stages from hunting and gathering to commerce and manufacturing.¹⁶ The problem is that this apparently universal movement of progress does not always unfold as effortlessly and as spontaneously as Enlightenment thinkers predicted. There is, as Marshall Berman reminds us, a darker side to development; one that turns out 'to exact great human costs [...] human powers can be developed only through what Marx called "the powers of the underworld", dark and fearful energies that may erupt with a horrible force beyond all human control.'¹⁷

It is the disorder and chaos of immanent development, Cowen and Shenton suggest, that leads to the modern idea of development as a planned and intentional course of actions. They insist that the idea of development as a means by which the state could impose order on the uncertainty thrown up by material transformation emerged first as a response to the growing fears of rapid urbanisation, poverty and unemployment during the early industrialisation of Europe in the nineteenth century. It thus emerged not as the equivalent of progress but 'as the

counterpoint to progress [...] based upon the idea that “development” may be used to ameliorate the disordered faults of progress.’¹⁸ As long as there is the historical process of immanent, materialist development, to paraphrase Cowen and Shenton, there will be conscious and intentional attempts to bring order to the disorder and chaos which inevitably follows in its wake.¹⁹

But just as important, one might add, has been the desire to use development to create and to intensify productive forces. In regions being integrated into a capitalist world system and where capitalist relations of production increasingly predominated, this has entailed the expansion of market-oriented production and the commodification of both human labour and its products. Here, we come to understand that development is both constructive and destruction, both positive and negative at the same time; like two sides of the same coin. Therefore the practices that were subsumed under the concept of development from its inception in the nineteenth century both unleashed social and economic forces and tried to manage and rein them in. The two polarities – higher production/better living conditions, stimulating material production/trying to control its destructive effects – are closely interrelated and inseparable.

II

Central to the idea of development as an intentional practice is the principle of ‘trusteeship’: only if those who possess the necessary knowledge and who understand the goals that should guide intervention are empowered to operate as ‘trustees’ for humanity, will the reconciliation of progress with order follow.²⁰ For the Saint-Simonians this meant placing society’s resources in the hands of bankers, through the creation of a central government bank. For Auguste Comte, a

student of Saint-Simon and founder of the doctrine of positivism, bankers would be aided by experts in the science of history or ‘sociology’ who understood the laws of social evolution. This doctrine of trusteeship would in time become the central ideological foundation of European colonial empire. For societies in which the conditions of development were not present and thus had to be made to happen, the process would be guided by trustees from societies where development had already taken place.

In the nineteenth century various imperial doctrines were formulated in which the principle of trusteeship was implicit. European colonialism, as Frederick Cooper observes, was constructed around ideologies of difference that justified foreign rule.²¹ Non-European native peoples were perceived as ‘backward’, static and trapped in their traditional or customary ways. Colonial conquest led to demands to incorporate and transform colonial societies through the introduction of western cultural norms and practices, especially the spread of Christianity and western education and medicine. Nevertheless, throughout the colonial period, authorities continued to emphasise the distinctiveness of non-European native peoples as a way of legitimizing European claims of cultural and political superiority.

Most prominent among these ideologies was the French doctrine of a *mission civilisatrice* associated with the Third Republic.²² Before the First World War, the most important tenet on which the French civilising mission rested was the *mise en valeur* or rational development of the colonies’ natural and human resources. The term *mise en valeur* was first popularised in the 1880s by Jules Ferry, a French government minister and Prime Minister under the Third Republic, who stressed that French colonial expansion was necessary because in a world of increasing international competition the growth of production and accumulation of capital required access to new outlets and control of new sources of raw materials. However, Ferry also

believed the ‘higher races’ had rights and duties towards the ‘lower races’ and were obligated to share the benefits of science and progress, to help spread civilization and republican values, and to help improve native living conditions. In other words, colonisation was not simply a question of French interests, though these were important, but it was also a matter of duty.²³

The new concept of ‘constructive exploitation’ rather than mere expansion and plunder gained prominence in the 1890s, becoming official policy in 1895.²⁴ It reflected the republican belief in science and technology as key to the mastery and rational control of nature, as well as a new interest in the role of the state in managing overseas resources. The aim, first and foremost, was to build a modern transportation network through railways, ports and other lines of communication, in order to ‘open up’ the interiors of Indochina and West Africa. It also sought to improve health conditions in the colonies through the introduction of medical research and sanitary services, although most resources benefitted Europeans and urban areas. In its widest sense, the *mission civilisatrice* envisioned the uplifting of France’s colonial subjects through the eradication of native institutions considered antithetical to republican values such as slavery and native chieftaincies, and the creation of a federal school system in West Africa to provide free, secular education to all Africans.²⁵ In keeping with the demands of *mise en valeur* the emphasis was placed on primary education and practical training, such as learning manual trades and studying agriculture. Nevertheless, assimilationist principles endured through the retaining of French as the language of instruction and the implicit belief that French civilization and culture were superior.²⁶

The French were not alone in constructing imperial ideologies. In the 1890s, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, promoted what he called the doctrine of

‘constructive imperialism’. Like Ferry, Chamberlain pushed for state intervention and assistance to develop what he referred to as the ‘imperial estates’:

Great Britain, the little centre of a vaster Empire than the world has ever seen, owns great possessions in every part of the globe, and many of those possessions are still unexplored, entirely undeveloped. What would a great landlord do in a similar case with a great estate? We know perfectly well, if he had the money, he would expend some of it, at any rate, in improving the property, in making communications, in making outlets for the products of his land, and that, it seems to me, is what a wealthy country ought to do with regard to these territories which it is called upon to control and govern. That is why I am an advocate of the extension of Empire.²⁷

Chamberlain called for the British imperial government to provide the necessary financial and technical assistance for the extension of imperial communications, especially railways, and other infrastructural projects in order to tap into the largely unexplored wealth of Britain’s colonial dependencies in tropical Africa and the West Indies.²⁸ As Colonial Secretary from 1895 to 1903, he pushed the Colonial Office to make greater use of scientific knowledge and technical expertise, especially in the fields of tropical medical and tropical agricultural research and training. He was instrumental, for example, in the establishment of the London and Liverpool Schools of Tropical Medicine and in the setting up of the West India Royal Commission, which recommended grants and subsidies to aid the declining sugar industry and to encourage economic diversification of the islands.²⁹

The goal for Chamberlain was to strengthen British industry and trade by harnessing the untapped resources and raw materials of the empire and by opening up lucrative new markets for British manufactured goods. But there was a darkside to Chamberlain's development doctrine, which as many contemporaries observed, involved the increasing exploitation of the colonies, and the sacrifice of the rights of indigenous peoples. And while he maintained that his policies would benefit both the 'cause of civilization' and the prosperity of the indigenous population, he nevertheless acknowledged that 'you cannot make omelettes without breaking eggs. You cannot exercise control over barbarous countries, which previous to your arrival have been in a state of constant anarchy and disorder, without occasionally coming into conflict with their savage rulers and having to shed some blood.'³⁰ In time, criticism and opposition to Chamberlain's brand of development would mount and demands for greater attention and protection of native people's rights and welfare would escalate. Liberal critics, in particular, argued that intervention was necessary, not to create the conditions for private capitalist development, but rather to halt the destruction of native ways of life and the erosion of communal land ownership on which traditional African society was said to be based.³¹

III

The 1920s represents a transitional phase between the old, predatory colonialism characterised by unfettered yet unsystematic economic exploitation, and a significantly reformed and modified system of colonial governance.³² The latter's main feature, a substantially enhanced role for government action, had its roots in earlier imperial ideologies, as noted above, but would gather speed in the aftermath of the First World War when the hegemony of the colonial state 'was consolidated and its rule thoroughly institutionalized.'³³ It is no coincidence that the two most

important programmatic texts sketching out the outlines for a revamped colonialism were published in the early 1920s.³⁴ French colonial doctrine reached its height with the publishing of Albert Sarraut's *La Mise en Valeur des Colonies Françaises* in 1923. Sarraut was a French statesman, Radical-Socialist, Governor-General of the Indochina federation and minister in several governments including Prime Minister twice between 1906 and 1940. During his tenure as Minister of Colonies from January 1920 to March 1924, and then as a member of various coalition governments in the late 1920s, Sarraut was the leading spokesman of the French colonial lobby, campaigning for state investment for the economic and social development of the French overseas possessions, especially Francophone Africa. His views are perhaps best captured in *La Mise en Valeur*, in which he called on government and parliamentary leaders to give greater attention to colonial policy, asserting that: 'It should not be forgotten that we are centuries ahead of them, long centuries during which – slowly and painfully, through lengthy effort of research, invention and intellectual progress aided by the very influence of our temperate climate – a magnificent heritage of science, experience and moral superiority has taken shape, which makes us eminently entitled to protect and lead the races lagging behind us.'³⁵

One year earlier, in 1922, Sir Frederick Lugard wrote *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*. Lugard had played a vital role within British colonialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, both as an ideologue and as an administrator holding key posts in Africa and Asia. In *The Dual Mandate*, which is widely credited with formulating the doctrine of British Indirect Rule in Africa, Lugard argued that Britain had a dual responsibility in Africa, both to the indigenous peoples whose interests and welfare had to be taken into account, and towards the whole of humankind since the immense resources of the continent had to be

exploited for the benefit of all.³⁶ Lugard was critical of past efforts to impose western models of government and education which he considered ill-suited to African beliefs and customs. Instead, he favoured an ‘appropriate native policy’ that emphasised administration ‘along native lines’ through the use of local indigenous chiefs and authorities and the creation of local courts.³⁷

The writings of Sarraut and Lugard on colonial rule reflect the growing importance attached to the principle of trusteeship in the 1920s, especially by the League of Nations, whose covenant proclaimed ‘that the well-being and development of [...] peoples [not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world] form a sacred trust of civilisation.’³⁸ Under the influence of the League, French and British attitudes towards their overseas dependencies began to change.³⁹ It is worth noting, for example, that Lugard was appointed the British representative on the League’s Permanent Mandate Commission (PMC) from 1919-36. The PMC was set up to guarantee protection for the rights and interests of the ‘natives’ of the Mandated Territories, as they were termed, while also serving to regulate the relations of imperialist nations in these territories. However, the tutelage of the Mandated Territories continued to be entrusted to the advanced nations by virtue of their proximity, resources and experience. What trusteeship actually meant in practice remained vague and unclear. Nevertheless, there was increasing pressure on colonial authorities in the 1920s to show that trusteeship, however defined, was being taken seriously.

Several new plans and programmes were introduced by both the French and the British in the 1920s. As was the case before the First World War, much importance was attached to investing in public works and communications, as well as scientific research, to increase the production and productivity of African agriculture. Sarraut, for example, proposed a fifteen-year investment programme to the National Assembly in 1921 to provide more than one billion francs

in government loans to build additional railways, ports, telegraph networks, roads, irrigation as well as schools, public health care, and research facilities.⁴⁰ The programme included funds for the expansion of cash crop production, including one of the largest rice and cotton irrigation schemes ever envisioned in colonial Africa, the Office du Niger project in the French Soudan. Office planners anticipated the reclamation of some 1,850,000 hectares of under-utilized land on the borders of the Sahara desert by resettling farmers on irrigated plots and introducing intensive plough agriculture and crop rotations.⁴¹ The goal was not only to produce more crops for the export market, but to generate a total social transformation of African society.

In the 1920s, French colonial authorities such as Jules Carde, the Governor General of French West Africa, also began to stress the *mise en valeur* of Africa's human resources as the key to tapping the continent's material potential. Carde advocated greater social investment in public health, education and labour productivity in order to increase the efficiency of Africa's 'native producers' and expand its humanpower. Modest steps were taken to prevent disease and mortality among the African population by, for example, setting up a new medical training centre for African doctors and midwives, the opening of medical dispensaries and maternity homes, and by organising mobile assistance units staffed with African auxiliaries to carry medical care into remote rural areas.⁴² French officials also allocated more resources to vocational education and training, which they saw as more appropriate for local circumstances in which traditional methods could be reinforced with nursery school practices to teach, for example, new agricultural techniques.⁴³

As the emphasis on adapting to local conditions and reinforcing tradition suggests, one of the distinctive features of French colonial policy after 1919 was the fusing of *mise en valeur* economic development with associationism – the French version of Indirect Rule – which held a

more positive view of African cultures and was more receptive to working through indigenous chiefs and political institutions.⁴⁴ The renewed interest of the French in ‘development along native lines’ (and this applies to British Indirect Rule as well), had less to do with a genuine desire to understand African cultures, than it did with imperial security and limiting the growth of anti-colonial discontent. As Martin Thomas argues: ‘Harmonious interracial contract required a common appreciation that colonialism amounted to more than untrammelled economic exploitation. Improved colonial living standards, vaccination programs, declining infant mortality, and higher life expectancy all promoted national efficiency, which, in turn, generated greater political loyalty to France among dependent populations.’⁴⁵ Or at least this is what proponents such as Sarraut believed.

There was also growing recognition in Britain in the 1920s of the need for closer imperial economic integration and greater metropolitan responsibility for a more coordinated, colonial development policy. In 1925, a parliamentary commission on East Africa, headed by William Ormsby-Gore, urged the imperial government to develop the vast productive areas of the region by investing in transport facilities, and to this end, London agreed to guarantee a £10 million East Africa Transport Loan over ten years for railway extension, harbour developments, the construction of main roads, and mechanical transport.⁴⁶ In the Sudan, the British government financed a £3 million loan for the Gezira Cotton Scheme, granted in 1913 but delayed by the war until 1920.⁴⁷ The scheme was a joint agreement between the state, which undertook the construction of the Sennar dam and irrigation canals, and the Sudan Plantation Syndicate, a commercial consortium who managed the project and ran the ginneries. Initially, the dam and canals provided irrigation to 80,000 feddans (or 83,040 acres) of land.⁴⁸

As was the case in Francophone Africa, British colonial administrators also began to turn their attention to what may be termed to ‘human side’ of colonial development, introducing programmes for ‘native’ education and public health in the 1920s that included the creation of rural medical dispensaries, centres for child and mother welfare, and the deployment of mobile laboratory and vaccination units for preventing the spread of epidemic diseases.⁴⁹ In the Gold Coast, the Prince of Wales’ College at Achimota, the first secondary school and teachers training college in British West Africa, was founded in 1924-5 at a cost of more than £500,000. According to Gordon Guggisberg, the Governor of the Gold Coast, Achimota was intended to serve as an educational model for the region, and in time, to develop into the first university.⁵⁰ The British also set up several, regional agricultural research and experimental stations, the most prominent of which was the East African Agricultural Research Station at Amani, Tanganyika, originally founded by the Germans before the First World War but re-established after years of neglect as a centre for basic, long-range research in 1927.⁵¹ Among other things, scientists at Amani conducted surveys of the regions’s basic soil types, and carried out trials on new crop varieties and cultivation methods to help boost African agricultural production.

In truth, both *mise en valeur* and the dual mandate were more rhetoric than reality, largely because the necessary political will and financial resources were lacking. Such efforts were tightly constrained by the doctrine of colonial, financial self-sufficiency. The severe spending limits imposed on the colonies under this doctrine meant that in the 1920s and 1930s neither the British and French, nor the Belgian and Portuguese imperial governments for that matter, were able to initiate and sustain major development projects. As a result, any development had to be paid for out of each colony’s own revenues generated from taxes on Africans and from custom duties imposed on imports and exports. Sarraut’s proposed investment

programme, for example, failed to gain parliamentary backing, as France's financial troubles and eventual devaluation of the franc in 1926 undercut official enthusiasm for *mise en valeur*. The Office du Niger project referred to earlier, had to rely initially on local funds only, which limited what could be done to opening two small farming centres in 1925 and 1929 and constructing a barrage at Sotuba, near Bamako.⁵² Overall, as Cooper notes, before 1940 the major European colonial powers in Africa rejected any development plans that would have entailed the significant use of metropolitan funding.⁵³ The parsimonious attitude of metropolitan governments meant that most colonies had very little in the way of investment funding and what they did have tended to be spent on railways and physical infrastructure that benefited the economic exploitation of natural resources, rather than on social services and welfare for Africans.

It is important to stress, moreover, that the meagre attempts to improve African living conditions and welfare, existed in tandem with other less savoury characteristics of the colonial system that were no less integral to colonial development such as the use of forced labour, the raising of hut and poll taxes, the displacement and movement of populations, and in some areas, the forced cultivation of cash crops like cotton.⁵⁴ In all colonial systems between the wars, public infrastructure projects such as railways or irrigation works were built by what amounted to a labour tax; forced African labour (what the French referred to as the *prestation* policy and the British as 'communal' labour), often with extremely high mortality and attrition rates.⁵⁵

IV

Given the externally-oriented and trade-dependent nature of colonial African states, it is not surprising that the world economic depression that began in 1929 exposed the contradictions and

tensions inherent in European colonial rule. Changes began to gather pace and gradually assumed a new complexion in the wake of the crisis. The British government's initial response was the Colonial Development Act of 1929, which largely followed the tradition of earlier policies, still representing a narrow economic conception of development mainly geared towards supporting the metropolitan economy. At the same time, the Act, which provided up to £1 million per year in Treasury grants and loans to aid a range of colonial government schemes, showed the increasing readiness of the imperial centre to make additional funds available in the name of development.⁵⁶ This reaction to the Great Depression, which had strong neo-mercantilist undertones, can also be witnessed in the case of France where the crisis magnified the importance of the empire as a *réservoir colonial*, providing a secure market, as well as an exclusive source of raw materials, for French industries.⁵⁷ The beginnings of a new departure in French colonial policy, aimed at accelerating the economic integration of the empire, can be detected in the 1930s as government expenditure for the *plans d'équipement* multiplied and the need for a program of public funding to finance major construction projects was recognised.⁵⁸ In 1931, for example, the metropolitan government finally agreed to include funds for the Office du Niger irrigation scheme as part of its colonial loans program, albeit at a much reduced level. A special administration was established a year later to manage the project, and in 1934 construction began on a new and larger barrage at Markala near Segu.⁵⁹

The *Office du Niger* was the most high profile agricultural project in all of French West Africa, foreshadowing many of the developmentalist ambitions of the Post-Second World War period. Indeed, as Christophe Bonneuil remarks: 'One can locate the birth of the developmentalist state in tropical Africa in the 1930s, when colonial governments confronted the disorders and the threats of the Great Depression, adopted a more *dirigiste* agenda, intervened

more directly in the economy, and took steps towards planning and state regulation. Major welfare and development policies also emerged in the 1930s and were key milestones in state building in Africa.⁶⁰ Indeed, if John Darwin is correct in suggesting that ‘the proactive or developmental state’ is one of, if not the most striking feature of late colonialism, then we can fairly situate the origins of the late colonial state in the fallout of the world economic crisis of the early 1930s.⁶¹

Several other contributing factors may be identified in the turn from the ‘preservationist colonialism of the 1930s’ to the ‘developmentalist colonialism of the 1940s and 1950s’.⁶² Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the volume of criticism of the old colonial system and calls for its reform magnified, not only from inside (for example, from members of the British Labour Party and the *Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière*) but also from the international community outside Britain, France, and the other colonial powers. Disapproval was heard from both moderate groups, such as the Aborigines Protection Society and other philanthropic non-governmental organisations, as well as from multilateral organisations such as the International Labour Office, and from more radical forums like the International African Service Bureau and the Pan-African Congresses. Compounding such criticism were the pressures of the Second World War, which created new demands on the colonial state to mobilise Africans for military service and to intensify colonial food and economic production for the war effort. Forced labour and recruitment was used extensively by both the British and French to meet the heightened strains of war, while consumption was reduced drastically by restricting imports and raising taxes. All of this entailed severe hardships and food shortages in many parts of colonial Africa.⁶³

But perhaps most crucial of all, as Cooper notes, in the 1930s and 1940s ‘colonial rule [in Africa] choked on the narrowness of the pathways it had created.’⁶⁴ Simply put, Africans were

increasingly unwilling to stay in the limited roles that colonial rulers had assigned to them. The result, as has been well documented, was widespread labour unrest and strikes between 1935 and 1950 across British and French Africa that crippled the key nodal points of empire: ports, mines, railways, and commercial centres.⁶⁵ In 1935 there was a strike in the copper mines and towns of Northern Rhodesia, and between 1935 and 1938, a series of strikes, demonstrations and riots swept across the British West Indies, including an island wide rebellion in Jamaica. In the late 1930s, strikes occurred on the docks of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam, on the railways and mines of the Gold Coast, and again on the Rhodesian Copperbelt in 1940. The strikes and riots continued after the war in the gold mines of South Africa in 1946, in Mombasa and Dar es Salaam in 1947, and in Accra and Southern Rhodesia in 1948. In Francophone Africa, strikes occurred in Senegal in 1945, and the entire railway system of French West Africa was shut down in 1947-8.

Unrest and conflict erupted in rural areas as well over government soil conservation measures in Eastern and Southern Africa, and after the war, there was a large protest of cocoa farmers in the Gold Coast over the government's swollen shoot eradication campaign which forcibly destroyed diseased cocoa trees.⁶⁶ This groundswell of resistance coming from Africans would eventually feed into the political movements and independence struggles of the 1950s, but initially these diverse grievances were more about demanding equal rights and entitlements such as equal work for equal pay or family allowances. As Cooper writes: 'The demands were not, at first, focused on taking over the state. But they were focused on what states actually did: on education, on taxation, on investment in social services and productive resources, on judicial systems, and on the question of who was to participate in the making of vital decisions.'⁶⁷

The European colonial powers responded to these pressures both from above and below in various ways designed to regain the initiative. Most notably, they sought to expand the scope of colonial development both by committing greater financial resources to the endeavour and by broadening the definition of development to include novel forms of social welfare services. In 1940, Britain enacted the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, which provided £5 million per year for ten years for development and welfare projects, plus £500,000 per year for ten years for research. The Fund was enhanced substantially by the 1945 Act which provided £120 million (amended to £140 million in 1950) to be made available over the next ten years with up to £17.5 million available in any one year. Up to £1 million per year was also provided for research with no time limit imposed on schemes of investigation.⁶⁸

The French passed a similar act, known as the *Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social* (Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development: FIDES) in April 1946, with a budget of 200 million CFA francs in 1947 increasing to 9,300 million CFA francs by 1950. In addition, the government established the *Fonds d'Équipement Rural pour le Développement Économique et Social* (Rural Economic and Social Development Fund: FERDES) in 1949, which invested a further 2,500 million CFA francs in French West Africa between 1949 to 1954.⁶⁹ Overall for the period 1940-58, Jacques Marseille estimates public sector funding outpaced private investment in the French empire by a ratio of 5 to 1.⁷⁰ Despite the new public credits, a great deal of French colonial development funding continued to come from internal revenues, raised through public borrowing and local taxation, as FIDES expected colonial states to match metropolitan funding at a rate of 45 per cent.⁷¹ Nevertheless, for the first time, both the British and French metropolitan governments were prepared to provide substantial subventions of metropolitan funds and resources to undertake programmes of

social and economic development in Africa, not only to build infrastructure and make economic production more efficient, but specifically to raise the standard of living of colonial peoples by investing in housing, water, schools, health services and so on.⁷²

With these policies, British and French colonial officials and rulers aimed not only to hold on to the colonial state, but to reinvigorate it by transforming it into a more effective instrument for development as a way of re-legitimizing the colonial mission. Correspondingly, state planning and administrative services were expanded dramatically in the 1940s.⁷³ All overseas British territories were instructed to prepare comprehensive ten-year development plans. At the same time, the Colonial Office was revamped by the formation of nearly two dozen specialist advisers and consultants and an equal number of specialised advisory bodies in areas such as social welfare, labour, economics, and cooperation. In the field, colonial technical and research services were enlarged and coordinated, and colonial service recruitment, especially technical personnel, was increased substantially. Between 1945 and 1952 over 10,000 new colonial service recruits were hired, 60 percent of whom were technical experts in areas such as agriculture, engineering, surveying, medicine, education, forestry, and town planning.⁷⁴ Under the framework of the post-war French Union, the Ministry of Overseas France was now joined by the technical ministries such as the Finance Ministry, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Education Ministry, who provided expertise and consultation in their respective areas of government intervention, sometimes through joint committees. At the same time, a specialized entity, the *Commission de Modernisation et d'Équipement aux Territoires d'Outre-Mer* was formed to administer the FIDES, and housed in the *Commissariat Général du Plan* so as to operate outside of the control of the Ministry for Overseas France and the Government-General

in Dakar.⁷⁵ And in Dakar, the government set up a planning directorate to examine development proposals prior to sending them on to the federal level.⁷⁶

Planning was thus part and parcel of the grandiose attempts at economic and social engineering in the post-war years. As Britain and France faced the loss of their possessions in Asia, their colonies in Africa promised to fill the gap and supply resources for post-war reconstruction. Fearing another global depression, European metropolitan governments sought to intensify colonial primary production in the hopes of meeting essential food and raw material shortages and securing protected markets for home industries and European investors. But more than this, as Nicholas White explains ‘the real attraction of the colonial empires in the era of reconstruction lay in the contribution they could make to relieving acute balance of payment deficits, and especially plugging the US dollar gap.’⁷⁷ Colonial exports would act as ‘dollar earners’ providing much needed foreign exchange to purchase food and goods for metropolitan reconstruction, while simultaneously serving as ‘dollar savers’ by supplying raw materials and commodities directly to the home market. Both Britain and France controlled financial and monetary policy through currency zones, coordinated by the Bank of England and the *Banque de France*, in order to centrally pool foreign exchange generated from colonial exports.

The British government also established two new public corporations: the Colonial Development Corporation (CDC), which was given the authority to borrow up to £100 million, and the Overseas Food Corporation (OFC), with up to £50 million. The new public corporations were designed specifically to increase the supply of colonial products for export as quickly as possible. The onset of the Cold War compounded this trend, leading the United States to include the colonies in the European Recovery Program (ERP) in 1949 on the grounds that stimulating colonial export production would not only aid the economic recovery of their European allies,

but also increase the supply of strategically valuable commodities.⁷⁸ Some 10 billion francs of Marshall Aid spending, for example, was funnelled into French West Africa between 1948 and 1952, mostly for the construction of railways, ports and roads.⁷⁹

Much of the public funding provided by the European metropolitan governments in the 1940s and 1950s went towards high prestige, capital intensive projects for infrastructure and agricultural development. Development projects of enormous proportions were drawn up and realised. In British colonial Africa, the two most notorious schemes were the East African Groundnut Scheme in Tanganyika, and the gigantic poultry farm designed to mass produce eggs in the Gambia. Both schemes proved to be dismal failures. In the case of the Groundnut Scheme, over 3 million acres were to be cleared and transformed into a hundred, 30,000 acre farming units, at a cost of £40 million. Every aspect of the vast project was to be mechanized, which at full capacity was projected to produce between 600,000 and 800,000 tons of groundnuts annually. The scheme, however, turned out to be a white elephant from the very beginning due, in large measure, to the insufficient examination of soil and climatic conditions, and an under-estimation of the difficulties involved in supplying and operating heavy tractors and planting machinery under tropical conditions.⁸⁰

For Francophone Africa, it is estimated that over 65 percent of the FIDES credits under the first four-year plan, and 45 percent under the second, went to infrastructure, much of it to high profile projects, such as the Vridi Canal in the Côte d'Ivoire, which by providing access to the sea transformed Abidjan into the major shipping and financial centre for French West Africa.⁸¹ Another major example was the Office du Niger irrigation scheme, which as we have seen had been in existence since before the Second World War, but was expanded substantially after the war with FIDES and FERDES support. An extensive project evaluation, commissioned

in 1945, initiated a shake-up of the scheme leading to the appointment of a new director, more indepth research on soil types and crop varieties, and the introduction of mechanized deep ploughing and experimental trials with chemical fertilisers.⁸² By 1959 roughly 35,000 African tenants had been settled on 36,000 hectares of irrigated land.⁸³ In the end, however, mechanisation proved to be too expensive and had to be abandoned in favour of a return to oxen-drawn ploughs. The costs of artificial fertilisers also proved prohibitively high, and in consequence Office managers increasingly relied on organic manuring by allowing nomadic pastoralists to graze their cattle on Office lands during the dry season. These various schemes in both British and French colonial Africa increased the number of technicians, administrators and other European employees, as well as the largess of financial resources and bureaucratic machinery. The scale and scope of the colonial development policies after 1945, and the level of state intervention that such policies entailed, has come to be described by historians as a 'second colonial occupation' in Africa.⁸⁴

V

Although the 'second colonial occupation' is associated primarily with Britain and France, it is important to see the emergence of the 'developmentalist state' as a common trend occurring across Sub-Saharan Africa in the late colonial period. This is not to say that important differences in periodisation and experience do not exist between the British and French empires on the one hand, and some of the other colonial regimes such as the Belgians and Portuguese. Nonetheless, in this as in several other respects the Belgian and Portuguese governments lagged behind but would eventually follow suit; Belgium introduced its ten year plan for the Congo in 1949, while Portugal turned to planning in the early 1950s.

Although the Belgian government never warmed to the idea of a metropolitan development fund, the Belgian Congo was nonetheless able to provide substantial welfare provisions funded through its own revenues, which expanded dramatically during the post-war commodity boom.⁸⁵ The Belgian Congo invested considerably in an African school system, which in 1945 was almost non-existent, achieving 70 per cent enrolment of primary school-age children by 1959. By the late 1950s, the Belgian colonial administration also boasted of having instituted the best health services in the tropics.⁸⁶ Higher education, on the other hand, was woefully neglected, such that at independence in 1960 only 16 Congolese students had graduated from the colony's two, infant universities at Lovanium and Elizabethville.⁸⁷

In the field of rural development, the Belgian colonial state began re-making African agriculture as early as 1936 with the introduction of large-scale, land utilisation schemes, known as *paysannats*, which by the mid-1950s had become home to some 140,000 resettled African farmers.⁸⁸ Like the Office du Niger, however, the Congolese *paysannats* turned out to be less than successful in practice as officials seldom took adequate account either of the challenging and variable environmental conditions at each site, or farmers' own livelihood strategies and responses to the schemes. On the Paysannat Turumbu near Yangambi, for example, Belgian agronomists developed a land-use and cropping system known as the 'corridor system' in which rectangular bands of cleared land alternated with bands of forest, and crop rotations included a twelve year fallow period. Despite years of testing, however, the experiment failed to maintain soil fertility, and in the end, farmers were advised to return to the traditional Turumbu farming practice of twenty-year-long fallow periods.⁸⁹

Portugal's commitment to maintaining its African colonies in the twentieth-century has often been portrayed as an aberration, as something running against the tide of change that rolled

across the other colonial powers in the late 1950s as they came to grips with the reality of African nationalism.⁹⁰ Portugal's late colonial experience as well as the timing of its demise is certainly distinctive. At the same time, it is equally clear that the colonial policies and practices of the *Estado Novo* (1933-74)⁹¹ must be viewed as part of the wider history of the era of the developmentalist state in Africa, which as Bonneuil observes, began in the 1930s but endured despite various alterations until the end of the 1970s.⁹² Portugal's African colonies took on a new importance during the *Estado Novo* under the dictatorship of Dr. António de Oliveira Salazar, and later Marcello Caetano, who insisted that Angola and Mozambique be regarded as an integral part of a single, unified Portuguese nation and thus designated administratively as 'overseas provinces'. Similar to Britain and France, the Salazar regime maintained, as Martin Thomas writes, 'that its colonial administration was a "scientific occupation", informed by the rational study of dependent peoples, the maximization of their economic potential, and benevolent, but authoritarian, governance. Where the Portuguese empire differed was in its stubborn adherence to this ideology of domination after 1945, at a time when other imperial states were adopting strategies of colonial development and greater political inclusion of subject populations, in an effort to assuage international criticism and breathe new life into their empires.'⁹³

That Portugal was able to sustain its predatory form of colonial rule unreformed for so long is attributable partly to the skillful use of ideology. In the mid-1940s, the Minister of the Colonies, Marcello Caetano, began promoting the concept of Lusotropicalism, an idea first articulated by the Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre, who believed the Portuguese had a unique ability for 'civilising' peoples of the tropical world by blending and assimilating indigenous cultures and values with their their own, rather than denigrating and discounting

them.⁹⁴ The Salazar regime appropriated the concept of Lusotropicalism as a ‘useful ideological veneer’, to borrow Penvenne’s term, in order to gloss over the continuing exploitation and colonisation of its African colonies.⁹⁵ In a sense they attempted to deflect criticism by arguing that their empire was a post-racial, post-imperial community of Lusophone peoples.

Determined to reinvigorate their colonial mission, the Portuguese finally began emulating the other colonial powers in the 1950s by introducing a series of ambitious, six-year development plans. The first *Plano de Fomento para o Ultramar* (Overseas Development Plan) for 1953-1958 provided roughly \$55 million in funding to Mozambique and \$100 million to Angola for investment on roads, ports, railways and other infrastructure and communication projects. Funding more than doubled under the second plan for 1959-1964, and investment diversified into health services, secondary and university education, and agricultural development.⁹⁶ And similar to the other colonial powers, much of the investment in agriculture committed by Portugal in the 1950s and 1960s went to high-profile, large-scale settlement schemes, such as the agricultural and irrigation settlements at Cela and Cunene in Angola, and similar projects on the Limpopo and Umbeluzi Rivers in Mozambique, which received the lion’s share of agricultural investment funds under the second Overseas Development Plan; 71 percent of Angola’s budget and 84 percent of Mozambique’s.⁹⁷

Portugal’s state-sponsored settlement schemes were distinctive however in that they were designed primarily for white settlers rather than Africans tenants. Indeed, the schemes were closely tied to the promotion of Portuguese overseas migration to Angola and Mozambique from the 1950s to the early 1970s. As a result of both economic incentives and government colonisation programmes, the white population living in Angola and Mozambique grew quickly after 1945, increasing from 71,521 in 1940 to 514,000 by 1973, with migratory flows reaching

their peak in the mid-1960s.⁹⁸ Even though most of the new settlers came from peasant backgrounds, the government's ambitious agricultural settlement schemes were not very successful with only a small fraction of the *colonos* remaining on farms and ranches in the countryside. Ironically, despite the rural bias propagated by official propaganda, the vast majority of the white population of Portuguese Africa was concentrated in urban centres.⁹⁹ As Cláudia Castelo observes 'the migration to Africa corresponded [...] to the wish of leaving the countryside. Few metropolitan peasants wanted to remain peasants in Africa; often they had previously migrated to the cities, within Portugal. Only a tiny minority went to the State sponsored rural settlements ("*colonatos*") in Angola and Mozambique and a significant percentage eventually gave up, settling down in the major cities.'¹⁰⁰

VI

Of all the interventions of the colonial state in Africa, those designed for agricultural intensification and rural modernization, such as the groundnut scheme, the Office du Niger, the Congolese *paysannats* or the Portuguese *colonatos*, were perhaps the greatest debacles of the age. They consumed massive amounts of investment funds and resources, including technical and administrative staff, while offering up very little in return. The Office du Niger, for example, was absorbing more than half of French West Africa's total agricultural budget by 1961, and yet only managed to produce 0.3 percent of the cotton it was projected to, while only 50,000 acres of the 3.2 million originally planned had been planted under the groundnut scheme by 1949 before it was shut down.¹⁰¹ These schemes came to epitomise the failings of the post-war colonial development drive, often exacerbating the social unrest and discontent they had been designed to mitigate. The compulsory measures and regulations, harsh conditions, and often forcible

recruitment of settlers, provoked deep hostility among African farmers and rural communities, and in turn, helped fuel anti-colonial political mobilisation in the 1940s and 1950s that accelerated decolonisation.¹⁰²

It is important to emphasise, however, that not all the initiatives of the developmentalist colonial state in Africa ended in collapse or disappointment. Important advances were made in education, with for example the establishment of the first universities after the Second World War, and in the expansion of medical facilities, hospitals, and infrastructure. There was greater political liberalisation by allowing Africans to unionise and form political organisations. The French created a unified Labour Code in 1952 that guaranteed all wage workers in the private sector a forty hour work week, paid vacations, the right to organize, and other benefits. The British introduced local government reforms and later internal self-government in many of its dependencies. Colonial development, as Frederick Cooper stresses, opened up new possibilities and spaces for African farmers and urban workers, while anticipations of the future inspired African political leaders to imagine alternatives ‘that were neither continuation of colonialism nor the break-up of empire into territorial nation states.’¹⁰³

At the same time, there were also clear limits to this reforming, modernising imperialism. During the 1950s the metropolitan states (and their publics, including prominent business leaders) grew more and more disillusioned with colonial development as it failed both to live up to the economic promises and to stem the growing tide of political discontent in the colonies themselves. Fissures and competing visions emerged within the metropolitan and colonial state and among governing elites which produced policy confusion and contributed to the sense of bureaucratic impasse.¹⁰⁴ Yet, in many ways, it was not the British or French or Belgian rulers who decided the limits, but the emerging African nationalist leaders, as well as the diverse

groups of Africans whose desires and energies they tried to channel. Colonial subjects turned the promise of development back on the colonisers, viewing development as an entitlement and right, the logic of which began to rapidly outstrip the boundaries of colonial rule itself.¹⁰⁵

In the final years of colonialism in Africa, the British, French and Belgians found themselves scrambling to guide the economic and social changes taking place as best they could and to strengthen informal ties to the metropolitan centre in such a way that they would survive political decolonisation. The Portuguese empire, because of its economic weakness and authoritarian political system, as well as the settler colonies in Southern Africa, tried to repress the anti-colonial uprisings but eventually they too were compelled to relinquish political power to African liberation movements. Only by the mid-1990s, after the decolonisation of Namibia and the end of apartheid in South Africa, had all of the African continent entered the post-colonial era.

The continuities between colonial to post-colonial concepts and practices of development are striking, which makes the study of colonial development critical to understanding the origins of modern development policies and their underlying mental and material structures. Nevertheless, it is important not to forget the crucial difference between colonial and post-colonial concepts of development. Colonialism as a ‘complex of philosophical exclusions’¹⁰⁶ created a system in which coloniser and colonised ‘belonged to two different and opposed universes.’¹⁰⁷ Under post-colonial conditions, however, ‘conceptually, *the “development”/“underdevelopment” contrast introduced the idea of a continuity of substance,* so that now the two terms of the binomial differed only relatively.’¹⁰⁸ To what extent the colonial hierarchies really have disappeared is open to debate. Undoubtedly, however, European colonialism in Africa sought to establish a rigid and formal hierarchical order with clearly

demarcated barriers between coloniser and colonised. This formal distancing influenced and shaped colonial development and the overall goals it set out to achieve in profound and contradictory ways. The ultimate ends for colonial modernisers was not to fashion an industrial society modelled on the metropole, but rather, an agrarian society with an efficient export production sector and pockets of mining, and with Africans firmly tied to the land as peasant farmers or stabilised in towns as urban labourers.

Notes

¹ United Nations Development Programme, *Africa Human Development Report 2012: Towards a Food Secure Future* (New York: United Nations, 2012), pp. 17-8.

² Ibid., p. 19.

³ Ibid., p. 17.

⁴ The World Bank, *Africa's Future and the World Bank's Support to It*, March 2011, www.worldbank.org/africstrategy, p. 4.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 4-5.

⁶ Nicholas J. White, "Reconstructing Europe through Rejuvenating Empire: the British, French, and Dutch Experiences Compared", *Past and Present*, Supplement 6 (2011), pp. 211-36.

⁷ CO 852/588/11, no 10, WP (44)643 "Future provision for colonial development and welfare": War Cabinet memorandum by Mr. Stanley, 15 Nov. 1944, in: S.R. Ashton and S.E. Stockwell, eds., *Imperial Policy and Colonial Practice 1925-1945*, British Documents on the End of Empire, vol. 1/A (London: HMSO, 1996), p. 205.

⁸ Frank Samuel, "Economic Potential of Colonial Africa," *Tropical Agriculture* (1951), p. 150.

⁹ A similar response was aired by spokesmen for French and Dutch imperial business interests such as Paul Bernard, managing director of *Société Financière Française et Coloniale* and Paul Rijkens, chairman of Unilever NV. See, White, "Reconstructing Europe through Rejuvenating Empire," pp. 235-6.

¹⁰ Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, "Introduction", in: Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, eds., *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), p. 7.

¹¹ This is a point that Fred Cooper has made with great force. See, Frederick Cooper, *Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002), pp. 38-65.

¹² To provide some necessary historical context, a few of the case studies, particular the two chapters on Portuguese colonialism, reach back to the origins of colonial development in the late nineteenth century.

¹³ Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton, "The Invention of Development", in: *Power of Development*, edited by Jonathan Crush (New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 28.

¹⁴ David Simon, 'Development Reconsidered: New Directions in Development Thinking', *Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography* 79, 4 (1997), pp. 183-4.

¹⁵ Jan Nederveen Pieterse, *Development Theory. Deconstructions/Reconstructions* (New Delhi: Vistaar 2001), p. 3.

¹⁶ Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, 2 Volumes (London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1776)

¹⁷ Marshall, Berman, *All that is Solid Melts into Air*, p. 40.

¹⁸ Cowen and Shenton, *Doctrines of Development*, p. 7.

¹⁹ Cowen and Shenton, *Doctrines of Development*, p. 173.

²⁰ Cowen and Shenton, *Doctrines of Development*, pp. 34-5.

²¹ Cooper, *Africa since 1940*, p. 16.

- ²² Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), p. 1.
- ²³ Gilbert Rist, *The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith* (London: Zed Books, 1997), pp. 51-5.
- ²⁴ Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, pp. 11, 41.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 77-9.
- ²⁶ Martin D. Lewis, "One Hundred Million Frenchmen: The 'Assimilation' Theory in French Colonial Policy", *Comparative Studies in Society and History* IV (1962), pp. 129-49.
- ²⁷ Joseph Chamberlain, 'Speech at Walsall,' 15 July 1895, in: George Bennett (ed.), *The Concept of Empire, Burke to Attlee, 1774-1947*, (London, 1953), p. 314.
- ²⁸ Robert V. Kubicek, *The Administration of Imperialism: Joseph Chamberlain at the Colonial Office*, (Durham, N.C., 1969), p. 69.
- ²⁹ Michael Worboys, "Science and British Colonial Imperialism," PhD Dissertation, University of Sussex, 1979, pp. 29-142; Worboys, "The Emergence of Tropical Medicine: A Study in the Establishment of a Scientific Specialty," in Gerard Lemaine *et al.*, *Perspectives on the Emergence of Scientific Disciplines*, (Paris, 1976), pp. 75-98; Worboys, "Manson, Ross and Colonial Medical Policy: Tropical Medicine in London and Liverpool, 1899-1914," in Roy MacLeod and Milton Lewis (eds.), *Disease, Medicine and Empire: Perspectives on Western Medicine and the Experience of European Expansion*, (London and New York, 1988), pp. 21-37.
- ³⁰ Rt. Hon. Joseph Chamberlain, MP, "British Trade and the Expansion of Empire," Speech given before the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce, 13 November 1896, in *Foreign and Colonial Speeches*, (London, 1897), p. 146.
- ³¹ Bernard Porter, *Critics of Empire: British Radical Attitudes to Colonialism in Africa, 1895-1914* (London, 1968).
- ³² See, Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, 'La Mise en Dépendance de l'Afrique Noire: Essai de Périodisation, 1800-1970', *Cahiers d'études africaines* 16, 61 (1976), p. 28.
- ³³ Crawford Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press 1994), p. 141.
- ³⁴ Frederick John Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (London: Frank Cass, 1965 [1922]); Albert Sarraut, *La Mise en Valeur des Colonies Françaises* (Paris: Payot 1923).
- ³⁵ Sarraut, *La Mise en Valeur des Colonies Françaises*, pp. 118-9, as quoted in: Rist, *The History of Development*, p. 58.
- ³⁶ Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, p. 617.
- ³⁷ Frederick Lugard, "Education in Tropical Africa", *Edinburgh Review* 242, no. 493 (July 1925), pp. 3-4.
- ³⁸ League of Nations, *The Covenant of the League of Nations* (1920 [cited 05.05. 2012]); available from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp.
- ³⁹ Penelope Hetherington, *British Paternalism and Africa, 1920-1940* (London: Frank Cass, 1978), p. 45; Rist, *The History of Development*, pp. 58-65; Susan Pederson, "Settler Colonialism at the Bar of the League of Nations," in: *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Caroline Elkins and Susan Pederson (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 113-34.
- ⁴⁰ Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, p. 217; Martin Thomas, "Albert Sarraut, French Colonial Development, and the Communist Threat, 1919-1930," *Journal of Modern History*, 77, 4 (December 2005), p. 926.
- ⁴¹ Monica M. Van Beusekom, "Colonisation Indigène: French Rural Development Ideology at the Office du Niger, 1920-1940", *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 30, no. 2 (1997), pp. 299-323; Van Beusekom, "Disjunctures in Theory and Practice: Making Sense of Change in Agricultural Development at the Office du Niger, 1920-1960", *Journal of African History* 41, no. 1 (2000), pp. 79-99; Van Beusekom, *Negotiating Development: African Farmers and Colonial Experts at the Office du Niger, 1920-1960* (Oxford: James Currey, 2002).
- ⁴² Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, pp. 218-22.
- ⁴³ Rist, *The History of Development*, p. 57.
- ⁴⁴ Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, pp. 174-202.
- ⁴⁵ Thomas, "Saraut, French Colonial Development, and Communism", p. 928.
- ⁴⁶ Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, Report of the East Africa Commission*, Cmd. 2387, April 1925; T161/297/S34608, CP434(25), 'East African development loan': Cabinet memorandum by Mr. Amery, 15 Oct 1925, in: S.R. Ashton and S.E. Stockwell, eds., *Imperial Policy and Colonial Practice 1925-1945*, British Documents on the End of Empire, vol. 1/A (London: HMSO, 1996), pp. 1-7.

⁴⁷ Stephen Constantine, *The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914-1940* (London: Frank Cass, 1984), pp. 23-4.

⁴⁸ The area covered by the scheme would continue to expand, especially after 1945, increasing to over 1.9 million feddans when the 1957 Managil extension was constructed. By the mid-1960s when the Al Roseires dam was completed, the scheme had become the centre of the Sudanese economy. See, Arthur Gaitskill, *Gezira: A Story of Development in the Sudan* (London: Faber and Faber, 1959), Tony Barnett, *The Gezira Scheme: An Illusion of Development* (London: Frank Cass, 1977).

⁴⁹ Joseph Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2007), pp. 117-43.

⁵⁰ Apollos O. Nwauwa, "University Education for Africans, 1900-1935: An 'Anathema' to British Colonial Administrative Policy," *Asian and African Studies* 27 (1993), pp. 282.

⁵¹ Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert*, pp. 109-11.

⁵² Van Beusekom, "Disjunctures in Theory and Practice", p. 82.

⁵³ Cooper, *Africa since 1940*, p. 17.

⁵⁴ Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, pp. 212-45.

⁵⁵ Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective*, pp. 174-6.

⁵⁶ The best source on the Colonial Development Act of 1929 is Stephen Constantine, who notes that most of the funds were given to defray the interest on loans raised by colonial governments. He calculates the total cost of schemes assisted by the Colonial Development Fund to be £17,286,773 by March 1939. See, Constantine, *The Making of British Colonial Development Policy*, pp. 164-226.

⁵⁷ By 1939, the empire absorbed over 40 per cent of French exports, and supplied 37 per cent of France's imports. See, Martin Thomas, "The roots of French decolonization", in *Crisis of Empire: Decolonization and Europe's Imperial States, 1918-1975*, edited by Martin Thomas, Bob Moore and L.J. Bulter (London: Hodder Education, 2008), p. 133. See also, Jacques Marseille, "The Phases of French Colonial Imperialism: Towards a New Periodization", *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 13 (1985), p. 132. Similarly for Britain, the proportion of domestic exports bound for empire destinations increased from 43.5 per cent in 1930 to 49.85 per cent in 1938. See, S.R. Ashton and S.E. Stockwell, "Introduction", in: *Imperial Policy and Colonial Practice 1925-1945*, p. ixiii.

⁵⁸ Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, 'La Mise en Dépendance de l'Afrique Noire: Essai de Périodisation', *Cahiers d'Études Africaines* 16, Cahier 61/62 (1976), pp. 39-40; Jean Suret-Canale, "French Tropical Africa: The Economic Background" in: *The Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization 1940-1960*, edited by Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 450.

⁵⁹ Van Beusekom, "Disjunctures in Theory and Practice", p. 82.

⁶⁰ Christophe Bonneuil, "Development as Experiment: Science and State Building in Late Colonial and Postcolonial Africa, 1930-1970", *Osiris* 15 (2000), p. 259. A number of other historians have also identified the Great Depression and the 1930s as the critical watershed in the emergence of the developmentalist state in Africa. See, Coquery-Vidrovitch, "La Mise en dépendance de l'Afrique Noire", pp. 28, 38-42; David K. Fieldhouse, "Decolonization, development, and dependence : a survey of changing attitudes", in: *The Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization 1940-1960*, edited by Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert*, pp. 144-206.

⁶¹ John Darwin, "What was the Late Colonial State?" *Itinerario* 23, No. 3-4 (1999), pp. 76-7.

⁶² Cooper, *Africa since 1940*, p. 197.

⁶³ Shipway, *Decolonization and Its Impact*, pp. 65-8.

⁶⁴ Cooper, *Africa since 1940*, p. 20.

⁶⁵ Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 57-65, 124-41, 225-60; Cooper, *Africa since 1940*, pp. 30-2.

⁶⁶ William Beinart, "Soil Erosion, Conservationism and Ideas about Development: A Southern African Exploration, 1900-1960", *Journal of Southern African Studies* 11, no. 1 (1984), pp. 52-83; David Throup, *The Economic and Social Origins of Mau Mau, 1945-53* (London: James Currey, 1987), pp. 149-50; Francis K. Danquah, "Rural Discontent and Decolonization in Ghana, 1945-51", *Agricultural History* 68, no. 1 (1994), pp. 1-19.

⁶⁷ Cooper, *Africa since 1940*, p. 37.

⁶⁸ Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, Statement of Policy on Colonial Development and Welfare*, Cmd. 6175, X (1940); CO 852/588/11, no 10, WP (44)643 "Future provision for colonial development and welfare": War Cabinet memorandum by Mr. Stanley, 15 Nov. 1944, in: S.R. Ashton and S.E. Stockwell, eds., *Imperial Policy and Colonial Practice 1925-1945*, British Documents on the End of Empire, vol. 1/A (London: HMSO, 1996), pp. 203-5.

The Colonial Office was able to persuade the Treasury to grant a further £115 million extension to cover the fund an additional five years from 1955-1960. See, L.J. Butler, "British decolonization, insurgency and strategic reverse: The Middle East, Africa and Malaya, 1951-1957", in: *Crisis of Empire*, p. 77.

⁶⁹ Tony Chafer, "Friend or Foe? Competing Visions of Empire in French West Africa in the Run-up to Independence", in: *French Colonial Mind, Volume 1: Mental Maps of Empire and Colonial Encounters*, edited by Martin Thomas (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2012), pp. 285-6.

⁷⁰ Jacques Marseille, *Empire colonial et capitalisme française: Histoire d'un divorce* (Paris, 1984), p. 105, cited in Nicholas White, "Reconstructing Europe through Rejuvenating Empire", p. 223.

⁷¹ Shipway, *Decolonization and Its Impact*, p. 118. Jean Suret-Canale estimates that of the 820.9 billion CFA francs in public investment in Francophone Africa for the period 1946-60, 569.8 billion came from the metropole, while 251.1 billion was derived from local budgets. See, Suret-Canale, "French Tropical Africa: The Economic Background", p. 455.

⁷² Cooper, *Africa since 1940*, p. 31.

⁷³ D. K. Fieldhouse, *The West and the Third World: Trade, Colonialism, Dependence, and Development* (Oxford, Malden, MA: Blackwell 1999), p. 85.

⁷⁴ Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert*, pp. 196-206.

⁷⁵ Chafer, "Friend or Foe?", pp. 281-8.

⁷⁶ Thomas, "The roots of French decolonization", in *Crisis of Empire*, p. 160.

⁷⁷ White, "Reconstructing Europe through Rejuvenating Empire", p. 214.

⁷⁸ White, "Reconstructing Europe through Rejuvenating Empire", p. 219.

⁷⁹ Thomas, "The roots of French decolonization", in *Crisis of Empire*, pp. 160-1.

⁸⁰ Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert*, pp. 209-13.

⁸¹ Suret-Canale, "French Tropical Africa: The Economic Background", p. 452; Shipway, *Decolonization and its Impact*, p. 119; Bill Freund, *The Making of Contemporary Africa: The Development of African Society Since 1800* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2nd edition, 1998), p. 170.

⁸² Van Beusekom, "Disjunctures in Theory and Practice", pp. 93-6; Van Beusekom, *Negotiating Development*, pp. 126-9.

⁸³ Bonneuil, "Development as Experiment", p. 262.

⁸⁴ D.A. Low and John Lonsdale, 'Towards the New Order, 1945,' in D.A. Low and A. Smith (eds.), *History of East Africa, Vol. III* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1976), pp. 1-63.

⁸⁵ Shipway, *Decolonization and Its Impact*, p. 118.

⁸⁶ Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective*, p. 212.

⁸⁷ Martin Thomas, "Contrasting patterns of decolonization: Belgian and Portuguese Africa", in: *Crisis of Empire*, p. 387.

⁸⁸ Bonneuil, "Development as Experiment", p. 264.

⁸⁹ Bonneuil, "Development as Experiment", p. 272.

⁹⁰ See, for example, Jeanne Marie Penvenne, "Settling against the Tide: The Layered Contradictions of Twentieth-Century Portuguese Settlement in Mozambique", in: *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 79-94.

⁹¹ The *Estado Novo* (New State) was a conservative, Catholic, and colonialist dictatorship which ruled in Portugal, from 1933 (date of approval of new Constitution of the Portuguese Republic) to 1974. It emerged following the military coup of May 28, 1926, which toppled the First Republic (1910-1926). Until 1968, its figurehead was António de Oliveira Salazar, president of the Council, who was succeeded by Marcelo Caetano. The military coup of April 25, 1974 overthrew the *Estado Novo* and paved the way for democracy in Portugal and independence for its African colonies. 1975 marks the end of Portuguese colonial empire, with the liberation of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe.

⁹² Bonneuil, "Development as Experiment", p. 259.

⁹³ Thomas, "Contrasting patterns of decolonization: Belgian and Portuguese Africa", in: *Crisis of Empire*, p. 394.

⁹⁴ Kenneth Maxwell, "Portugal and Africa: The Last Empire", in: *The Transfer of Power in Africa*, pp. 337-8; Cláudia Castelo, '*O Modo Português de Estar no Mundo*'; *O lusotropicalismo e a ideologia colonial portuguesa, 1933-1961* (Porto, Portugal: Edições Afrontamento, 1998).

⁹⁵ Penvenne, "Settling against the Tide", p. 81.

⁹⁶ Penvenne, "Settling against the Tide", p. 84.

⁹⁷ Penvenne, "Settling against the Tide", p. 84.

⁹⁸ Cláudia Castelo, *Passagens para África: o povoamento de Angola e Moçambique com naturais da metrópole (1920-1974)* (Porto, Portugal: Edições Afrontamento, 2007), pp. 59, 97, 143.

⁹⁹ Maxwell, "Portugal and Africa: The Last Empire", p. 339; Thomas, "Contrasting patterns of decolonization", p. 397.

¹⁰⁰ Cláudia Castelo, "Colonial Migration into Angola and Mozambique: constraints and illusions", unpublished paper, p. 12.

¹⁰¹ White, "Reconstructing Europe through Rejuvenating Empire", p. 221; Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert*, p. 211.

¹⁰² Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert*, pp. 214-26. See also, Monica Van Beusekom and Dorothy Hodgson, "Lessons Learned? Development Experiences in the Late Colonial Period", Special Forum, *Journal of African History* 41 (2000), pp. 29-130.

¹⁰³ Frederick Cooper, "Reconstructing Empire in British and French Africa", *Past & Present*, Supplement 6 (2011), p. 208.

¹⁰⁴ The importance of competing policy agendas and bureaucratic confusion in the late colonial mission has been noted in both the French and British case. See, Chafer, "Friend or Foe?" pp. 176, 280-8; Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert*, pp. 226-30.

¹⁰⁵ Cooper, *African since 1940*, pp. 20-37.

¹⁰⁶ Olúfemi Táíwò, *How Colonialism Preempted Modernity in Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2010), p. 39.

¹⁰⁷ Rist, *The History of Development*, p. 73.

¹⁰⁸ Rist, *The History of Development*, p. 74. Emphasis in the original.